Dear TTC Board members,
TTCriders is a membership-based organization of transit users. Over the past several weeks, riders have noticed reduced speed zones on the TTC, causing longer travel times and wait times between trains. Transit riders have felt frustrated by the lack of communication and transparency about the cause of the slow zones and when they will be lifted. The TTC has shared that Reduced Speed Zones (“RSZs”) have been effective on 21 segments of the network. As of February 14, 2024, segments with reduced speed zones encompassed around 17% of the entire subway system (23.1 km of RSZs). [1]
The TTC has stated that reduced speed zones were “imposed at the end of January after an annual survey found large sections of the subway track had state-of-good repair needs.” [2] It defies belief that such widespread track defects could appear at one time.
Independent transit expert Steve Munro recently discovered that four external consultant reports about the Scarborough RT derailment were quietly published to the TTC website that reveal issues with how the TTC does track inspection and maintenance, [3] but these documents have not yet been reported to TTC Board members in a public meeting.
We are writing to raise serious questions about the lack of transparency from TTC management, whether warnings about maintenance protocols were heeded, and whether inspection, preventative maintenance, and State of Good Repair funding have been adequate.
1. What is the timeline to complete subway track work in Reduced Speed Zones?
Transit users support and understand the need for Reduced Speed Zones to ensure public safety and complete necessary track work. TTC management should be transparent with the public and Councillors on the TTC Board about both the severity of safety concerns and timelines to complete required work.
2. Why have the external consultant reports about the Scarborough RT derailment not been reported publicly to the TTC Board?
The TTC Board received a presentation about the Scarborough RT derailment in September 2023. [4] Four consultant reports about the derailment, the earliest published in August 2023 and the latest in November 2023, were later published to the TTC website but never reported to the TTC Board. [5] These reports raise troubling questions about track inspection and maintenance across the entire TTC subway system, not just the Scarborough RT.
3. Did TTC management heed the warnings about patrolling and defect classification raised by Network Rail Consulting in early 2023?
The report by Network Rail Consulting suggests the TTC was warned in early 2023 that there were problems with the way it does inspections and prioritizes maintenance work:
- “In early 2023, I expressed my concern to Track about restricting track inspections to patrollers only” (p.13). The report author proposed an alternative hierarchy of inspection to address the issue.
- “In early 2023, I investigated the defect and priority classification and presented a revised defect priority regime to TTC Track and Engineering as the defect numbers throughout the TTC system are far higher than expected, currently around 12,000 in total for all defect types, thus making effective defect planning impossible to reduce the number. Using colour codes is not an effective way to manage defects. Instead, I proposed using a monthly coding system which allows a better level of planning for the more severe defects and allows for defects to be moved up the priority scale as reported by the patrollers.”(p.14)
- The report recommended “a comprehensive review of the track and its defect type, track geometry, RSZ’s and renewal history.”
The consultant report written by Systra Canada concludes that while the root causes of the Scarborough RT derailment on July 24, 2023 are known and “come from a failure of the reaction rail anchors which caused the reaction rail to lift,” the “derailment can also be explained by several contributing factors” (p. 21, Systra Canada report). Of the seven factors listed, two were identified by Network Rail Consulting in early 2023: The poor prioritization of defects and lack of experience of track patrollers.
4. Were the recommendations from the August 23, 2023 Network Rail Consulting report acted on immediately? Have new inspection protocols been introduced, such as identifying “combination defects”?
The Network Rail Consulting report recommends that track inspectors be trained in the risks of “combination defects” and notes that “realising the impact of multiple defects in the same location would change the priority and could require an RSZ” (p. 12, NRC report).
5. Who made the decision to reduce preventative maintenance work on the RT?
Systra Canada states that a contributing factor to the derailment was the reduction of preventative maintenance work after the TTC announced that the Scarborough RT would be closing in the future. “Anchor bolts were never subjected to preventive maintenance” (p. 20, Systra Canada) and “the reaction rail was no longer maintained in a preventive way leaving only the 72 hours track patrols to detect any potential issues” (p. 16).
6. When was the last track geometry review on the subway network?
The consultant report prepared by Systra Canada [6] explains that track geometry is meant to be checked once a year and that “the last passage has not yet been confirmed by TTC, but it seems to be in 2018 or 2019, which is a long time until 2023 without geometry survey” (p. 14, Systra report). The Systra report appears to be referring to a track geometry review of the Scarborough RT, but does not indicate when the TTC last conducted a system-wide track geometry review on the subway.
7. Why were there Reduced Speed Zones on a newly-opened subway extension?
The RSZs effective February 14, 2024 included a segment “Northbound from Highway 407 to Vaughan Metropolitan Center.” This section of subway track opened in December, 2017 as part of the Toronto-York Spadina Subway Extension. This only adds to our concern that maintenance procedures have been lacking.
In summary, transit riders and Toronto residents deserve honest answers about why TTC management failed to act on warnings about Scarborough RT maintenance, why external expert reports have been kept quiet instead of being shared publicly at a TTC Board meeting, and why slow zones have been ordered as well as timelines for maintenance work completion. Consultant reports have identified flaws in TTC processes to assess and act on defects. TTCriders calls on the TTC Board to address these issues and communicate to the public about the state of the system and steps being taken to prevent future failures.
Sincerely,
-TTCriders
References:
[1] https://www.ttc.ca/service-advisories/subway-service/Reduced-Speed-Zones
[2] https://www.thestar.com/news/gta/is-your-ttc-subway-commute-feeling-even-longer-than-usual-heres-why/article_2c1413be-caa6-11ee-bbfc-837ada455091.html
[3] https://cdn.ttc.ca/-/media/Project/TTC/DevProto/Documents/Home/About-the-TTC/TTC_final_report_Line_3_SRT_Version-D_2023-11-30.pdf
[4] https://cdn.ttc.ca/-/media/Project/TTC/DevProto/Images/Home/About-the-TTC/Car-Derailment-Investigation-on-the-SRT-System-within-the-TTC-Network.pdf
[5] https://stevemunro.ca/2024/01/31/the-scarborough-rt-derailment-technical-reports/
[6] https://cdn.ttc.ca/-/media/Project/TTC/DevProto/Documents/Home/About-the-TTC/TTC_final_report_Line_3_SRT_Version-D_2023-11-30.pdf
Graphic created by August Puranauth, representing RSZs reported on February 14, 2024:
Highlights from key consultant reports:
Network Rail Consulting report, published August 23, 2023: https://cdn.ttc.ca/-/media/Project/TTC/DevProto/Images/Home/About-the-TTC/Car-Derailment-Investigation-on-the-SRT-System-within-the-TTC-Network.pdf
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At the time this report was written, forensic analysis and identification of root causes were still ongoing. However, the Network Rail Consulting report states that “the following can be attributed to the accident:”
- “Lack of sufficient training on the reaction rail;”
- “Prioritizations of reaction rail defect;”
- “Removal of reaction rail defects;”
- “Focusing only on red and yellow defects; and”
- “Gaps in the TTC track standards;”
- “Relying solely on patrollers inspecting the track and having no mandated hierarchy for track inspection.”
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The Network Rail Consulting report makes a number of recommendations, including two that the TTC was warned about previously:
- “Proposed Hierarchy of Inspection”: The report states that “in early 2023, I expressed my concern to Track about restricting track inspections to patrollers only,” and that an inspection hierarchy was proposed.
- “Revised Defect Priority Regime”: The report states that the TTC is not using an effective system to manage defects and notes that Network Rail proposed an alternative system in early 2023.
Systra Canada report, published November 30, 2023: https://cdn.ttc.ca/-/media/Project/TTC/DevProto/Documents/Home/About-the-TTC/TTC_final_report_Line_3_SRT_Version-D_2023-11-30.pdf
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Seven “contributing factors” to the derailment were identified by the Systra Canada report:
- “Data Migration from MOWIS to MAXIMO,” a change in the software that the TTC uses to track defect data; the report calls for this migration to be “reviewed and better documented”;
- “New anchor bolt design,” which the report calls “questionable” and which lacks supporting engineering documentation;
- “Reduction of preventive maintenance” after the line was announced to be closing.;
- A lack of “top cap painting,” which made it more difficult for track patrollers to detect issues with the condition of the reaction rail;
- “Training and experience of track patrollers.” The report found “the experience of the track patrollers is low” and suggested their training be updated;
- “Priority level.” The priority given to defects was described as “problematic” because of a lack of criteria and because defects are evaluated individually, so a combination of defects is not considered when assigning a priority level - meaning the severity of defects were underestimated;
- “Reaction Rail height measurement,” which the report says should have happened more frequently.
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The Systra Canada report makes six recommendations:
- “Improve communication and training between maintenance personnel,” and involving personnel such as forepeople, roadmasters, and other roles in the track patrols;
- “Improve the priority level definition,” in order to interpret the severity of defects and “assign an appropriate priority level to a combination of defects”;
- “Define a clear inspection program for track survey” [this recommendation is specific only to the Scarborough RT, as the investigation did not evaluate processes used on subway lines];
- “Improve maintenance organization” by clarifying the roles and responsibilities of different departments;
- “Audit the engineering review process” to make sure future “design changes such as the new anchor bolt design is reviewed diligently before being released”;
- “Update maintenance procedure documentation.”
- Track geometry is meant to be checked once a year and that “the last passage has not yet been confirmed by TTC, but it seems to be in 2018 or 2019, which is a long time until 2023 without geometry survey” (p. 14, Systra report).
Hatch report, published September 28, 2023:
https://cdn.ttc.ca/-/media/Project/TTC/DevProto/Images/Home/About-the-TTC/Scarborough-Rapid-Transit-SRT-Vehicle-Accident-Investigation-Report.PDF
Gannett Fleming report, published October 12, 2023:
https://cdn.ttc.ca/-/media/Project/TTC/DevProto/Images/Home/About-the-TTC/SRT-Derailmnent---Ellesmere-Station---Forensic-Assessment-Report.pdf